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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
Vol. 47

APRIL, 1949

No. 6

DELIVERED PRICES: DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE
PRESENT LAW*
Corwin D. Edwards**

What is involved in doing business under the present law concerning delivered prices? Since the ease or difficulty of doing business
in accord with the law depends upon what the law permits and prohibits, to answer this question requires an assumption about what the law
is. I shall assume that the scope of legally permissible action is that
envisaged in the statement which the Federal Trade Commission issued
to its staff and released to the public last October 12.1 This statement
says, in effect, that businessmen are not required to sell f.o.b. mill or to
adopt any particular form of pricing practice. They are free to meet
competition individually or reciprocally so long as in doing so they are
not endeavoring to create a monopoly or rigidly conforming to a trade
practice to eliminate price competition. They are forbidden to engage
in a price fixing conspiracy by use of a geographic pricing formula, to
participate individually in the tacit continuance of such a conspiracy,
ancl to use a pricing system which involves different delivered costs to
buyers in different locations, if the result is to injure competition among
sellers or buyers, and if the differences do not reBect differences in delivery expense. The law seeks to identify the point at which what is
called meeting competition actually becomes a deliberate effort to get
rid of competition. The law seeks to prevent price differences which
injure competition but not to require that prices or mill net realizations
shall be uniform.
·
In the controversy which has raged about the recent basing point
decisions, one type of complaint has been that, although the law tech,. Adapted from a speech delivered by Mr. Edwards before the Philadelphia Chamber of
Commerce on January 25, 1949, at the Warwick Hotel in Philadelphia. In his speech, Mr.
Edwards stressed that he was expressing his personal views and not necessarily the official
views of the Federal Trade Commission. Footnotes have been added by the editors-Ed.
,,.,,. Director, Bureau of-Industrial Economics, Federal Trade Commission-Ed.
1 "Commission Policy Toward Geographic Pricing Practices," 3 C.C.H. TRADE lu!G.
REP. 1l 10,411 (1948).
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nically considered may mean this, the freedom which it apparently
leaves for business decision does not actually exist. As a practical
matter, some argue that to meet competition is so risky that a wise businessman will seldom do it, and that the hazards which surround all
geographic pricing practices except f.o.b. mill pricing are so great that
in practice business is driven to the f .o.b. mill formula.
However, the distinction between meeting competition and what
the Federal Trade Commission has often called matching prices is more
than a verbal trap for the unwary; indeed, the two types of behavior are
sharply different, so that it is hard to see how a businessman could inadvertently engage in one while thinking that he is engaged in the other.
Recognizing this, what safeguards are available to business in determining how far and under what conditions freight may be absorbed
and mill net realizations may be allowed to vary?

I.

COMPETITION OR CONSPIRACY?

The first of the two problems to be discussed here is whether and
how far a businessman can meet competition without being accused of
conspiracy.
It is clear in the record that meeting competition •is not outlawed.
The commission said officially in October that it will not question the
meeting of "readily foreseeable competition," either by a single competitor or by reciprocal price reductions, where the practice does not
tend to create a monopoly and is not of such a scope "as to preclude
variety of delivered prices and raise the problem of collusion."2 The
Supreme Court has specifically recognized that businessmen have the
right to meet competition if the practice is not systematic.3 In the two
basing point. cases in which the Court discussed this question, it rejected the defense that competition had merely been met, not because
such a defense is insufficient, but because the facts showed that what had
been done was not mere meeting of competition in good faith but was
an expression of a quite different purpose than appears in meeting competition.4 However, the Federal Trade Commission has made clear
that it will challenge industry-wide programs of matching delivered
prices; and the Supreme Court has indicated that it will not regard as
merely meeting competition the concerted· industry-wide -µ~e of a pricing formula or the adoption by one concern of prices based u~on an2 Id. at ,r 10,500.
s F.T.C. v. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 65 S.Ct. 971 (1945).
4 Id. at 758; F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 at 721-726, 68 S.Ct. 793 (1948).
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other concern's plant where the result is a pattern of phantom freight
and freight absorption maintained regardless of the presence or absence
of competition at the various delivery points involved.
, It is argued by those who express alarm on behalf of business that
. there is no clear distinction between what is sanctioned and what is
forbidden and that the only safe practices are those which are not commercially practicable. The argument is as follows: an enterprise selling
over a wide market area cannot in practice make new prices for each
transaction at each point. It must have a general pricing policy. When
one competing seller wishes to invade the market territory of another,
the invader cannot charge more than the home producer is charging,
does not wish to charge less, and does not have to do so in order to sell.
Thus, it is said, the mark of competition is to meet the price of one's
competitor. As a second, a third, and a fourth producer enters the market, it is contended, each encounters the same conditions, responds in
the same way, and thus helps to create an identity of delivered prices
exactly like that which the commission condemns. How, it is asked,
can the businessman hope to avoid the charge of price conspiracy except
by either confining himself to his own home territory or offering price
reductions which he knows are too small to be effective or too large to
be necessary?
If it is actually true that the identity of competitive prices looks just
like the price identity which emerges from a price fixing conspiracy, the
problem created by this resemblance is not confined to the basing point
cases alone. The same problem arises in any price conspiracy. A corollary is that circumstantial evidence cannot fairly be used to prove price
conspiracy' and, therefore, that as soon as the government relies upon
anything other than direct proof of written agreements, meetings, and
the like, every competitor is in as much danger under the law as a pricefixer. If this is true, it presents a grave dilemma, for the commission
must either adopt a rule of evidence which jeopardizes the innocent
along with the guilty or else so circumscribe admissible evidence that
moderately careful conspirators may avoid being caught. To assert the
reality of this dilemma is to break sharply with established legal doctrine
and with the common-sense economic ideas upon which this legal doctrine rests. It is to reverse the precedents of nearly 60 years under the
anti-monopoly laws. For these reasons this novel idea should not be
accepted without very careful scrutiny.
5

But see Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. F.T.C., 168 F. (2d) 175 at 180 (1948).
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One element of truth should be recognized in this line of argument.
This element is that an observer who attempts to form an opinion from
outside by merely looking at the price structure of an industry at a
given moment may be unable to distinguish between identical delivered prices originating in competition and identical delivered prices
originating in conspiracy. There is a possibility, therefore, that a law
enforcement agency suspicious of widespread price identities may inquire about a situation that is truly competitive. This possibility is no
reasonable basis for alarm, for if the law is to be enforced there will
necessarily be some investigations in which the persons investigated are
found to be guilty of nothing. The significant question is whether a closer
examination will reveal differences between competitive and collusive
. patterns of identical prices and whether these differences are of a kind
which businessmen can bear in mind in order to keep out of trouble,
The notion-that trouble is likely, though plausible at first glance,
rests almost equally upon a misconception of the commission's attitude
toward identical prices and a mis-statement of the character of competitive price behavior.
·
When the commission examines the prices and price policies of the
members of a business group in a conspiracy case, it regards the information before it as evidence bearing on the question whether the members of the industry have conspired. Whether prices are identical,
whether they are rigid, and how they move relative to each other are
significant so far as they illuminate the ultimate question of conspiracy.
The commission has no interest in identical prices that are accidental or
that express intense competition. It has no interest in rigid prices that
merely reflect unchanging economic circumstances. It has no interest in
uniform price changes if circumstances arising in good faith competition explain these changes. The commission's concern is that each businessman shall feel free to set any price he wishes in his own interest,
whether or not his action pleases his competitor, a:Qd that each businessman shall make up his mind independently as to the nature of his business interest. The commission desires to preserve the opportunity for
buyers to protect themselves by choosing among several sellers who
may diverge· in their policies, instead of permitting variety of price policies to be eliminated, with the inevitable consequence that regulation
by the state will be invoked as a substitute protection for the buyer. But
in preserving variety of policy and the resultant possibility of variety in
prices, the commission does not, of course, insist that prices shall be always
different. Competition produces innocent uniformities,. and the com-
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mission knows it; but competitive behavior, both in business and in
other aspects of life, also shows varieties of response often enough to
prevent patterns of conduct from becoming frozen.
This statement of the commission's objectives has been implicitly
challenged by recent comment about the second count of the Conduit
case. 6 Critics of the decision say that the commission tried to make a mere
identity of prices a violation of law by each concern quoting the price,
even if the identity was produced by competition. But the commission
has explained what it means very differently, and the respondents in
fact were found to be guilty of a price-fixing conspiracy. The effect of
the second count was to enable the commission to order them not to
continue the same prices and pricing practices as before on the pretext
that each concern had individually and separately decided to perpetuate
the effects of the conspiracy. Such claims have been made by respondents in other cases. Under count two the commission charged action
which amounts to tacit conspiracy-that is, conformity to a pattern by
each member of a group in the knowledge that the others were conforming also and in contemplation that price competition would be
eliminated thereby. The point of the charge, therefore, is that an individual may not participate in a tacit conspiracy.7 The commission has
explained publicly that in its opinion this charge does not expose to
legal action any practice which does not involve conspiracy or elimination of price competition.8
The question remains, however, whether the commission can distinguish the competitive situation it is trying to maintain from the collusive one it is trying to prevent.
The commission has no need to rely merely upon the way prices
behave, for in the ordinary case it is possible also to develop evidence
of joint action in adopting the plan, joint establishment and use of machinery to make the plan work, disciplinary measures used against persons who do not follow the plan, and economic effects such as the antimonopoly laws are designed to prevent. In the decided basing point
cases there was evidence that the price formulas in use in the industry
had been jointly adopted for the specific purpose of eliminating price
competition and that the businessmen who used them had set up machinery for making sure that the participants conformed to the plan.9
6Ibid.
Id. at 180.
s 3 C.C.H TRADB RBc. RBP. 11 10,411 (1948).
s F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 at 710, 68 S.Ct. 793 (1948).
1
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In some of the cases there was evidence that anybody who did not conform was disciplined. 10 This is the customary pattern, and where it
prevails there is no substance in the claim that those who took part in
the conspiracy did so unwittingly. The present problem is likely to
appear only in the rare case in which what starts out as a competitive
pattern may evolve into a tacit conspiracy through the codification of
business customs.
Even in such tacit conspiracies, however, there is a sharp distinction
between competition and collusion, both in the way prices behave in
the market and in the way in which businessmen who make the prices
behave and think.
The difference in price behavior exists because under competition,
though prices may be uniform for a time, they do not show continuous
and rigid uniformity like that of a collusive scheme. True, competition
tends to make prices identical if the goods sold are identical. However,
there are relatively few industries in which the products of different
sellers are actually the same from the point of view of buyers. Cement
has often been cited as an instance; yet the evidence in the recent Cement case showed that the quality of cement differs substantially, and
that to prevent this difference from affecting prices the cement companies found it necessary to agree not to disclose their quality differences.11 Moreover, even if quality is the same at a particular moment,
improvement of the product is not likely to take place simultaneously
in all producing establishments. In a competitive market producers
characteristically emphasize the superiority of what they have to sell,
even to the extent of magnifying minute and unimportant differences.
When they succeed in persuading buyers that their product is distinctive they often quote a distinctive price for it. By contrast, under price
conspiracies producers may insist upon the uniformity of their product,
deny the existence of quality differences which are actually important,
and either refrain from making improvements or refrain from calling
attention to them until the entire industry is ready to move simultaneously.
Even where a commodity is actually and continuously uniform regardless of its source, competition usually produces recurrent price differences as well as recurrent price uniformities. Though the product is
uniform, the conditions under which business is done are never con10 Id. at 714.
11 Id. at 715.
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tinuously uniform. Some concerns have an expanding volume of business and some a declining one. Some have high inventories, others
have low. Some serve customers who are capable of making a product
for themselves, while others serve customers who have no such option.
For a host of reasons such as these, the importance of new business is likely to differ from one concern to another, and the amount of
business which would be gained or lost if the price were changed is
likely to differ also. Just as some buyers pay a premium for goods in
time of shortage, so some sellers cut their prices below the rest of the
market when they are overstocked and their sales are slow.
Moreover, enterprises do not always agree in predicting the trend
of business; consequently, under competition, when one leads off with
a price increase or decrease, there is no certainty that the others will
follow. Sometimes the leader is allowed to experiment alone with the new
price level, and after watching his experiment his competitors may
decide to imitate him or to stand pat and wait for him to recognize that
he ,,vas wrong.
Because of such elements of diversity, price differences frequently
appear. Indeed in every anti-monopoly case I have ever examined in
which documentary evidence proved there was a conspiracy to make
prices identical the conspirators failed to prevent some departures from
the agreed price structure. Though price uniformity for brief periods
is characteristic of competition as well as of conspiracy, continuous
price uniformity, rigidly adhered to over long periods, justifies an inference of conspiracy which grows in strength with each increase in the
rigidity and duration of the structure. Moreover, since the rigidity is
never complete, there is always a chance for the investigator to find out
what happened when the structure 1,vas not followed. For this reason
anti-monopoly cases do not rely merely upon inferences from price
identity even when the conspiracy is tacit rather than overt.
In the conspiracies that use basing point formulas, the flow of goods
in the market also tends to be different from the flow that might be
e:x-pected under competition. Actual competitive markets, unlike the
theoretical models of competition in a perfect market, usually show a
certain amount of cross-hauling; it is impracticable in most cases for each
buyer to tum to the nearest producer and each producer to the nearest
buyers. Nevertheless, there is a tendency under competition for wasteful forms of cross-hauling to be held to minimum. Goods flow readily
from areas of surplus production to areas of deficit production, but there
is not much Bow from one deficit area to another or from one surplus

a
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area to another. There is very little How indeed from deficit areas to
surplus areas. By contrast, the basing point formulas which a:re used in
conspiracies are typically arranged so that no buyer anywhere suffers
any penalty if he purchases from the most distant source of supply in
the industry; in consequence, the patterns of commodity flow are often
perverse. Shipments from deficit areas to -surplus areas, from one deficit
area to another, and from one surplus area to another appear to be much
more common than in competitive industries. The result is an amount
of cross-hauling so large as to constitute a substantial economic waste
and to give rise to expressions of concern by the sellers themselves. But
even wastes so great that executives deplore them are not quickly corrected where there is a basing point conspiracy, for the sellers who find
the price structure least appropriate to their own interests do not feel
justified in changing their pricing practices unless the rest of the industry is willing to cooperate. This sacrifice of the interest of the firm
for the sake of industry-wide uniformity in practice is not characteristic of competition.
.
The way businessmen behave about price policies under competition is also different from their behavior in conspiracy.· Because of the
uncertainties and recurrent diversities of competition, businessmen in
a competitive market cannot confidently predict every price which their
competitors will ma.ke in every transaction. In routine business transactions in markets where the How of information is good, business predictions, though not perfect, may have a high degree of accuracy.
But when a sale is unusually important and when the conditions of the
market make information hard to get, uncertainty is common. By contrast, a tacit conspiracy carries an obligation not to depart from the
established price formula; so long as the formula is used, each businessman may predict his competitors' prices everywhere, on large orders as
well as small, in sealed bids as well as in open markets. When bids to
the government are regularly found to he uniform from all bidders
down to the last decimal point, conspiracy is a.reasonable inference.
The accuracy of business predictions where there is a conspiracy
rests upon decisions that are implicit in the undertaking to make identical delivered prices by formula. The first decision is that, although
each member of the group may reduce his profits on a transaction substantially to meet the price of another member, he will forego the business rather than sell below the other member's price. Under competition there are, of course, many cases where businessmen merely meet
a competitor's prices, but there are also cases where a seller sees that at
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the same prices he will lose the business and where he wants the order
enough to beat a competitor's price instead of merely meeting it.
The second decision inherent in the collusive use of basing point
formulas is that each member of the group will surrender all initiative
in changing prices within the territory regarded under the formula as
lying within the price-making area of some other member of the group.
Conversely, each member of the group expects a similar surrender of
initiative by the other members as to the making of price changes within
his own territory. In a basing point system delivered prices are calculated from one or more basing points, and the territory in which the
computation of delivered prices is governed by a particular base may be
called the area of that base. Inherent in a conspiracy which uses such a
formula is the presumption that price changes in any- base area will be
initiated by a seller located in the base area and that all other sellers
will follow such changes but will not initiate them. In practice the
seller at the base can consider changing his prices without worrying
about the pricing plans of nonbase producers or of producers at other
bases; in tum he surrenders his own initiative in price-making outside
his base area. In a conspiracy which uses a freight equalization formula,
each producing plant is a base. In this type of pattern each producer
enjoys, in adjacent territory, an initiative in price-making which is not
challenged by producers located elsewhere. The only exception to this
general rule appears in the case in which someone has failed to abide
by the price formula upon which other members of the group take the
initiative in reducing prices in his home territory foi disciplinary purposes. This ·type of mutual forbearance contrasts sharply with the initiative that is characteristic of a competitive market, for under competition a seller may take the initiative in reducing prices in distant localities
in order to enlarge his business there. He is unlikely to refrain from
changing his price in territory adjacent to his plant until the price there
is changed by a distant producer, as is the practice of nonbase mills
under a basing point system.
Equally striking is the difference between competition and-conspiracy in the way businessmen react when they find that a competitor has
not done what they expected. When differences appear in the prices
of competitors, a difference large enough to divert trade is regarded as
a business problem, to be considered and met in the same spirit as a
change in the price of raw materials. An inconsequential difference is
usually ignored. In a conspiracy an inconsequential difference due to
some anomaly in the price formula is regarded as a serious matter,
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which top executives spend time and trouble to remove. Any difference
due to failure to use the formula is considered a breach of faith. If there
is no adequate explanation or apology, the concern which does not follow the formula is likely to be disciplined by devices ranging from social
boycott of its executives to punitive price cutting.
This leads to the conclusion that, even where conspiracy has not
been overt, as it usually is, there is a clear distinction between competition and conspiracy in the way businessmen think and act and in the
way prices behave. The distinction can be recognized by businessmen
even more readily than by government investigators, since the facts
which the government must painstakingly discover are intimately
known by members of an inc;lustry in making their day to day decisions.
If there is a member of an industry who has accepted its trade practices
witho.ut bothering about their effect on competition, a few minutes of
self-analysis should be sufficient to enable him to be sure of what he is
doing. Such persons must be rare; there cannot be such a thing as an
industry-wide conspiracy of which all the participants are innocently
unaware. Even if the commission were to regard circumstantial evidence from price behavior as a sufficient test of conspiracy-as has not
been its practice-the chance that competition could be mistaken for
conspiracy would be remote.

II.

FREIGHT ABSORPTION AND PrucE D1scRIMINATION

The second problem to be discussed here is this: can a businessman
absorb freight without being accused of unlawful price discrimination?
Under the law of price discrimination a prima facie violation depends upon two elements: difference in the prices which a seller
charges different customers, and a resultant injury to competition.12 If
this is proved there are two defenses, either that the price difference
mer:ely reflects a difference in cost or that the difference has appeared
merely because the seller, acting in good faith, met the equally low price
of a competitor.13
The argument that f.o.b. mill pricing is necessary to avoid illegal
discrimination runs as follows: a seller who serves many customers in
many localities cannot be sure that none of his customers will be injured by differences between what they pay and what other customers
pay. Therefore, if he is to avoid a prima facie violation he can do so
12 Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. L.1526, 15 U.S.C. §13(a) 1936).
13 Id., §l3(b). See also 2 C.C.H. TRADE REG, REP.· fifi 2212-:2217 (1948).
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only by avoiding different prices to different customers. On the assumption that price means the net realization of the seller at the point of
shipment, this means that to avoid differences in price one must keep
all net realizations equal, a result which we are told is possible only
under f.o.b. mill pricing. Moreover, so runs the argument, the courts
have held that the meeting of competition in good faith is an -adequate
defense only in sporadic and isolated transactions, whereas a seller with
many customers cannot afford to make new prices for each transaction.
Since the defense of meeting competition is not adequate, the only safe
course, if one is to sell at different prices, is to use a method of pricing
under which all price differences are justified by differences in cost.
But since the only pricing system in which geographic price differences
correspond to differences in transportation costs is f .o.b. mill pricing,
the search for an adequate defense comes out at the same place as the
effort to avoid a prima facie violation-at f.o.b. mill pricing.
This argument is exaggerated and misleading. Its assumption that
the commission is committed in all delivered price cases to a definition
of price as the net realization at the mill flies in the face of the commission's own statement made last October.14 The commission stated that
in using methods of exposition in this and other basing point cases
which treated the mill realization as the price, there was no intent to
prejudge price uniformity of the postage-stamp type. The commission
pointed out that, under a basing point price formula, price discrimination exists under any definition of price. This means, in effect, that
the commission's definition of price is not the source of whatever problems business may now be facing with reference to geographic price
discrimination.
Moreover, the implicit assumption that safety can be assured for
business by defining price as the delivered cost to the buyer is manifestly untrue. Such a definition would mean that uniform nation-wide
delivered prices on the postage-stamp model would be defined as nondiscriminatory, but all other methods of pricing-basing point, f.o.b.
mill with or without freight equalization, c.i.f. one or more central
markets, or delivered in two or more zones-would be thus defined as
discriminatory and exposed to whatever legal hazards may be inherent
in discrimination. If one accepts the common law definition of price as
whatever the buyer and seller establish as the price in the particular
transaction, industries like cement, in which the evidence showed that
14

3 C.C.H. TRADE Rim.

REP.

,r 10,411 at ,r 40,412 (1948).

754

MICHIGAN

LAw REvrnw

[ Vol. 47

legal title passed to the buyer at the mill, will still be analyzed as the
cement industry was; any geographic pricing practice will be regarded
as discriminatory or nondiscriminatory according to the accompanying
circumstances. So long as the law of price discrimination applies even
if the buyers are located in different places, there will be no possibility
of solving the problems of all sellers by a definition of price.
With these preliminary matters cleared away, the business problem
about discrimination through freight absorption can be stated thus: in
considering geographic pricing practices that may be ·regarded as discriminatory, can business afford to take chances of discovering and
avoiding these relationships that create injuries to competition or of
defending itself where there is injury by pleading that competition was
met in good faith? Or must business play safe by using only pricing
methods in which price differences reflect differences in cost? Only in
f.o.b. mill pricing, or in delivered pricing in which the delivered prices
consist of a uniform mill net plus actual transportation expense, do the
differences in price correspond to differences in cost. If, therefore,
nothing but the cost defense gives reasonable safety, an f.o.b. mill pricing system is indicated, whereas if there is reasonable safety in other
methods of pricing, there is scope for freight absorption.
The recent Court decisions make it clear that although meeting
competition may justify a price discrimination this defense may be overworked. Under the circumstances of the Staley and Cement cases the
Supreme Court rejected the plea that meeting competition was sufficient defense.15 Some have argued that in the light of these decisions
such a defense has no validity except_ in isolated transactions. This
argument does not rest on the decided cases, for in each instance the
ground of the decision was that the facts showed, not a mere meeting
of competition in good faith,· but a purpose and effect quite different.
The claim rests merely upon certain incidental remarks in these cases,
and these dicta themselves are capable of more than one interpretation.
For example, one dictum often quoted says that the meeting of competition does not justify systematic price discrimination; 16 and the word
systematic can be interpreted either as referring t~ an industry-wide
reciprocal matching of prices, such as was the practice of the defendants before the Court, or to a regular practice by a single enterprise in
all its marketing operations, as is usually assumed by persons who ex15 F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 at 722 and 726, 68 S.Ct. 793 (1948);
F.T.C. v. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 at 757, 65 S.Ct. 971 (1945).
1s F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 at 725, 68 S.Ct. 793 (1948).

1949]

DELIVERED PRICES

·755

press alarm about the statement. It is axiomatic that dicta are not binding upon the Court and cannot reasonably be used to predict the probable views of the Court in future cases except where the various dicta
point in the same direction. By such common sense, the present emphasis upon dicta in the basing point cases is unjustified, for various
dicta point in opposite directions. Dicta in the Cement case, for example, can be interpreted to condemn uniform delivered pricing,1 7 but a
much more explicit dictum in the Staley case appears to say that the
practice is not discriminatory.18
If the dicta are recognized to be inconclusive, the rest of the picture should be reassuring to business. The commission's policy statement of last October says that the commission will not challenge price
reductions by a single concern or by two or more concerns reciprocally,
made to meet readily foreseeable competition, unless these reductions
are of such scope as to preclude price competition and raise the problem
of collusion.19 Collusion aside, therefore, the commission has recognized the validity of the defense of meeting competition in such cases.
In so far as there are risks in basing one's whole pricing method
upon discriminations that are not otherwise justifiable and hoping to
defend these as a mere meeting of competition, the crux of the business
problem is whether businessmen can adequately identify injuries to
competition inherent in their pricing methods. The law recognizes
three kinds of injury-one which arises among sellers by virtue of conspiracy to discriminate; another which is imposed by one seller upon
another seller in an attempt by the first seller to obtain a monopolistic
position; and a third which arises among buyers or their customers
where the buyers who pay the high prices cannot compete effectively
against the buyers who pay the low prices. 20
The first two types of injury can be easily recognized and can
scarcely exist without deliberate intent on the part of the seller. Therefore, they need not detain us. Since the third type of injury appears in
competition to which the seller is not directly a party, it is less easy to
detect. Whatever difficulties there may be in doing business under the
present law cluster at this point.
The problem is not peculiar to geographic price relationships. It
arises with reference to quantity discounts, volume discounts, and any
17Jbid.

lllF.T.C. v. Staley Mfg Co., 324 U.S. 746 at 757, 65 S.Ct. 971 (1945).
10,500 (1948).
(1948).

19 3 C.C.H. TRADE Riic. REP. ,i 10,411 at ,r
20 See 3 C.C.H. TRADE Rile. REP. ,i 10,412
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other price differences which a seller may establish. Some degree of
difficulty is inherent in the statute so long as the illegality of a pricing
practice depends not upon the nature of the practice but upon its effect,
and so long as the effect in question appears in competition among customers, where the seller may be unable to foresee it.
Though the furor about freight absorption suggests that this type of
difficulty is conspicuous in geographic price discriminations, the problem of unforeseen injury appears to be less in such discriminations than
in most others. There can be no injury to competition among buyers
in different localities unless the difference in the prices they pay is
great enough to create an injury. This means that such an injury will
not arise in the handling of freight charges for products for which the
freight expense is relatively unimportant. As to other products, there
can be no injury to competition among buyers unless the buyers are in
competition with each other, and customers in different localities are
less likely to compete against each other than are customers who merely
buy different quantities. Moreover, if a low price is already available
to a buyer merely because of his location, and through rio exercise of
quasi-monopolistic buying power, the mere absorption of freight by
some distant seller to quote him the same price and thereby give him
another potential source of supply is not likely to injure other buyers
who compete with him. Thus injury to competition among buyers is
difficult to perceive in many patterns of freight absorption.
Moreover, a method of establishing geographic price differences
which may put a particular buyer at a disadvantage in the purchase of
one of his raw materials may give him an advantage in the purchase of
another. (In this respect geographic discriminations work quite differently from quantity discounts, which tend to create a cumulative advantage for large concerns and a cumulative disadvantage for small ones.)
Such peculiarities tend to make injuries to competition among buyers from geographic price discriminations much less probable than similar injuries from discounts for quantity or volume. Whereas the commission has found such injuries from discounts in many cases,21 it has
found them in only three basing point cases, and in all three instances
there was reason to believe that the highly artificial price structures from
which the discriminations arose had been established by conspiracy.22
21 See 2 C.C.H. TRADE Tum. REP. ,r
22 F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333

2023 (1948).
U.S. 683, 68 S.Ct. 793 (1948); F.T.C. v. Staley
Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 65 S.Ct. 971 (1945); Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. F.T.C.,
168 F. (2d) 175 (1948).
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The <:omrnission has found injury to competition among buyers from
geographic discrimination only in basing point cases. It has publicly
announced that such injury is improbable in uniform delivered pricing
because it is improbable that buyers will be injured simply because they
acquire products at the same delivered cost. The same principle obviously applies to buyers within any single zone of a zone pricing system.
The risk of unlawful injury to buyers appears to be confined, for practical
purposes, to the basing point industries and to the zone differentials of
zone pricing systems.
Even with these qualifications considered, there is still some possibility that injuries will arise in competition among buyers through
freight absorption by a seller who serves a wide market area and who sells
to many different customers. The problem is one of the least of the business problems inherent in the Robinson-Patman Act, but it is a problem
nevertheless.
But there is no more need for business, for this reason, to B.ee to a
geographic price structure designed rigidly to reB.ect cost differences than
there is for business to meet its problems as to quantity discounts and
other aspects of the price structure by basing all price variations upon
cost variations. The practical safeguard for businessmen with regard to
freight absorption, as with regard to other methods of varying prices, lies
in customers' complaints upon being hurt. The first complaints against
a seller's prices go to the seller. It is when the customer obtains no relief
by private complaint that he turns to the government. Accordingly, in
practice a seller has opportunity to identify the injuries to competitic;m
among his customers if he pays reasonable attention to their complaints,
analyzes those parts of his pricing practices which they call to his attention, and makes such changes as his analysis suggests. The Federal
Trade Commission does not, in fact, receive complaints about price discrimination from buyers of goods based merely upon the seller's absorption of part or all of the freight in selling to their competitors. From this
absence of complaints made to the commission, it would seem there are
relatively few complaints to sellers also, and that injury to competition
among buyers from this practice, unaccompanied by phantom freight,
is rare. Whether this assumption is correct businessmen probably can
decide on the basis of experience, for their customers' complaints afford
an opportunity to avoid being surprised by unforeseen charges that they
have discriminated in violation of the law.
The discrimination problem may be summarized thus: under the
law of price discrimination, illegality depends upon the effect of a prac-
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rice, and therefore there is ·no perfect certainty that any practice cannot
possibly be challenged. F.o.b. mill pricing is safe because if it causes injury the defense of cost can always be used. Apart from collusion or effort
to create a monopoly, uniform delivered pricing is reasonably safe, for
practical purposes, because of the improbability that it will create an
unlawful injury to competition among buyers. Freight absorption in
good faith to meet competition is reasonably safe for the same reasons,
and so long as it does not preclude price competition and raise the problem of collusion the commission will not attack it. Basing point systems
and zone systems with price differentials between zones involve risk,
though probably less than appears in connection with quantity discounts.
The risk in using such systems can be substantially reduced by a seller
who analyzes the complaints of his customers and changes his prices to
remove any injury that appears.
All this means that recent developments do not force businessmen
who wish to avoid an unreasonable risk to do so by adopting f.o.b. mill
pricing. A concern which is willing to protect its customers from injurious discriminations can do so without being limited to one kind of pricing practice. Neither do recent developments prevent businessmen from
meeting competition. A businessman who is not and has not been party
to a price conspiracy can meet competition freely, with no more danger
of being falsely accused of price fixing than of being falsely accused of
any other breach of law. The law means what it meant before the controversy started: that business must avoid conspiracies to fix prices and
discriminations that injure competition. American business has been
able to thrive within the limits set by these principles. Under the recent
basing point decisions it can continue to do so.

